Rig Veda: Amalgamation of the Aryans with the natives

A very interesting thing in North India is that almost all the languages and dialects are derived from Sanskrit or Persian, both of which are Indo Iranian languages. Apart from the few pockets of tribal areas, where Austro Asiatic Munda languages are spoken, Indo Iranian languages are spoken almost every where from Afghanistan to Assam. This means that the Indo Iranian languages took over almost all the native languages of which Munda and Burushaski may be just the two known to us. We've seen in Languages of Aryan Trail that Dravidian languages were never native to northern India. So we discount them as being taken over by Indo Iranian languages.

Let's see some of the other cases of language takeover in historical times.

The most recent scenario of immigration of non native elites imposing a foreign language on the subdued natives is the arrival of Europeans in the American continents. The mainly English peoples subjugated the native Americans in what later became USA. Traces of the ancient native languages in USA are now limited only to names of places and rivers like Mississippi and Missouri. English is the dominant language in USA now but the American Indians still speak their native language. Even centuries of subjugation and elite dominance couldn't impose English and Christianity on them. The Bolivian and the Peruvian Indians may be Spanish speaking Christians now, but a large part of them still speak the native Queucha as well. Many native customs and tenets of the Inca religion still survive, often in a Christian garb.

After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 AD the elite dominance of the Norman French peoples influenced heavily and nearly replaced the Anglo Saxon, Welsh and other native languages of England. But in the end nothing happened. Apart from a few family names there are only very few remnants of that conquest and centuries of elite domination by the Normans.

The Russian language was enforced on the erstwhile Soviet Republics of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan etc.). Now that the USSR has disintegrated the fate of Russian in all these countries is questionable. The Turkish language didn't survive in the Ottoman empire in Balkans. Even the bloody Arab dominance on the Parsis, that led to the coining of the term persecution, couldn't replace the Persian with Arabic. Even centuries of elite dominance by the elite English peoples in India couldn't replace any of the regional languages.

So it's very obvious that an elite dominance very rarely results in a complete language takeover, something that happened in India with the advent of the Indo Aryans peoples. So it's logical to believe that such a feat was achieved not by elite dominance, but through amalgamation and absorption of the native peoples. More than everything they showed better ways of lives to the native peoples. They brought considerable change in their standard of living. They made them prosperous.

Indus valley didn't know the use of plough. They had a primitive way of cultivation by using fertile silt left by periodic flooding of the rivers. Artificial dams and barrages were used to flood the river. This very flooding, which was so essential for farming, might have been one of the causes for the decline of their civilization. Lack of better agriculture is a striking difference from Mesopotamia and Sumer. Indus Valley had no canals as in Mesopotamia. Much less surplus in grains might have been the reason for the lack of internal competition and also external attack. That might have been the reason too for minimal change over 1500 years. The Aryans destroyed the dams and brought greater areas under cultivation. RV mentions Indra destroying Vritra, which means restrainer, obstacle and may refer to the barrage that obstructs the water. Indra is said to have removed rodhas, meaning obstacle but used in RV in context of dams and embankments. The Aryans broke barriers between primitive and conservative tribes which had managed to preserve their archaic religion and tools for long. They introduced better production techniques. Several groups of people separated for ages were brought together. Various skills, which were local secret, became public, thus stimulating more trade and prosperity.

A similar thing would have happened in BMAC around 1900 BC when there was a sudden surge of wealth with the arrival of the Indo Aryans from the northern Arkaim and Sintashta Cultures.

The Aryans never displaced anyone or enslaved entire lots of natives. The Aryans brought in new techniques and knowledge and provided the much needed guidance that led to their prosperity by better harnessing natural resources, producing more and enhancing trade and commerce. This made the Aryans very much acceptable to the natives as their elites.

In most cultures the natives were always enslaved by the intruders. But in case of the Aryans there are multiple instances where the natives were promoted to the ranks of elites. Discussions on Peoples & Conflicts during Rig Vedic times have many such instances. In fact the addition of shudra as the fourth class was to accommodate the natives. It may be still argued that the natives were put in the lowest stratum of the society. But still that's much better than treating them as slaves.

Anyway, coming back to the topic of language takeover it's important to understand that such a thing was possible not through force. Rather it was done through amalgamation and cooperation. It's a very rare instance in the history of mankind that a few elites make such a positive impact on the lives of the natives that they eventually adopt not only the language but also the culture and religion of the former.

What is the idea of India

by Amartya Sen Reproduced from here Political and cultural developments in India over the last few decades have had the effect of forcefully challenging, in several ways, the broad and absorptive idea of Indian identity that emerged in the days of the Independence movement and which helped define the concept of the Indian nation. If we believe that there is something of value in that inheritance, there is a need to understand more clearly precisely why it is valuable, and also examine how that recognition can be articulated… I shall take as my starting point Rabindranath Tagore's remarkable claim that the "idea of India" itself militates "against the intense consciousness of the separateness of one's own people from others." Note that there are two distinct implications of this claim. First, internally within India, it argues against an intense consciousness of separated culture and the privileging of one religious community over the others, and also more generally, of any one group vis-à-vis the others in any principle of classification (such as caste, class, gender, or region). Second, externally in relation to the world, Tagore's claim argues against the intense consciousness of the separateness of Indians from others in the world, and it also rejects seeing Indian culture as fail and fragile - to be protected through isolation from outside influences. Tagore's claim involves, therefore, an integrative message - internally as well as externally - and it proposes an inclusionary and absorptive form for the idea of Indian identity. This inclusionary claim has been seriously challenged in recent decades through the advocacy of internal as well as external separatism. ********* On the philosophical side, we must first examine, if only briefly, the general nature of identity as a concept. The subject of identity in general, and social identity in particular has been something of a philosophical battleground in recent years, partly because of the global skirmished related to identity politics and communitarian philosophy. The debates have often been so unstructured that I must say that it is not really a delight to enter this battleground. However, these general issues have to be addressed before we proceed to examine the demands of Indian identity in particular. Discretion, alas, need not always be the better part of valour. The importance of the idea of identity can scarcely be doubted. It is of central relevance in understanding a diverse basket of practical problems, as varied as violence in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, racial discrimination in America or anti-immigrant violence in West Europe, the current controversies surrounding the idea of being British in a multi-ethnic Britain, not to mention the growing appeal of fundamentalism in Asia and Africa. Our behaviour and our commitments are deeply influenced by the way we identify with some people and not with others. It is, however important to be clear about the demands of the idea of identity. In particular, we have to resist, I have argued elsewhere, two unfounded but often implicitly invoked assumptions: one, the presumption that we must have a single - or at least a principal and dominant - identity; and two, the supposition that we "discover' rather than choose our identity. ********* The issues of plurality and of choice are immensely relevant to the understanding and analysis of the idea of Indian identity. In arguing for an inclusionary form of the Indian identity, Tagore or Gandhi did not deny the presence and contingent importance of other identities. Rather, in the context of political coherence, social living and cultural interactions, both emphasised the fact that the Indian identity could nto favour any particular group over others within India. Tagore was different from Gandhi in having a less conventional view of his Hindu identity, and indeed in his The Religion of Man, pointed also to the fact that his family was the product of "a confluence of three cultures, Hindu, Mohammedan and British." Gandhiji's Hindu identity was sharper, and he held regular prayer meetings, in a largely Hindu form (even though other religions were also invoked). But Gandhi did not differ from Tgore in seeing no contradiction between a strongly Hindu identity and an overwhelming commitment to an Indian identity in political and social matters. Indeed, Gandhiji gave his life to a great extent because of his commitment to the latter, in the hands of someone with a simpler view of the congruence of Indian and Hindu identities. ********* I argued earlier that bother philosophical and historical issues are involved in the idea of an Indian identity. It may be thought that the discussion so far has been less historical than would be necessary, in order to resolve such questions as the relation between a Hindu identity and an Indian identity So I must now take up some historical questions I do this with some hesitation, since after my opening address at the last Indian History Congress in January, no less an authority than the Director of the Indian council of Historical research was reported in the papers as having said that I must not speak on history since I am not an historian. I take the point, but I must confess to being a repeated offender, and not just in history. I had to give the opening address also at the last Indian Sociological Congress without having a degree in sociology, have foolhardily lectured in law at Oxford, Yale and Chicago without a degree in law, have shamelessly been a professor of philosophy at Harvard for a decade without a degree in philosophy, and I am afraid I am somewhat determined to speak on history today without a degree in history (but hopefully with the kind indulgence of the ICHR) Those who argue that the Indian identity has to be in some way derivative on Hindu identity point out not only that the Hindus constitute a large majority of people in this country, but also that historically Hinduism has been the mainstay of the Indian civilization. There is clearly some substance in this argument, and the counter arguments can be considered only after the basic facts of the case have been recognised. There are three distinct issues here, of which the first is not concerned directly with history at all. As I have already argued, identity is not a matter of discovery-of history any more than of the present - and has to be chosen with reasoning. Even if it were the case that Indian history were primarily Hindu history, we still would have to determine how a pluralist and multi-religious population can share an Indian identity without sharing the same religion. This, of course, is the basis of secularism in India, and our reasoning about priorities in dealing with competing conceptions of Indian identity need not be parasitic on history. The makers of the Indian constitution recognised that fully, as did the United States in adopting a largely secular constitution for a mostly Christian population. The need to reason and choose cannot be given over to the observation of history, and this point relates to a more general claim I have tried to defend elsewhere - in a lecture to the Asiatic Society entitled 'On Interpreting India's Past' - arguing that while we cannot live without history, we need not live within it either. The second point is more historical. India has been a multi-religious country for a very long time. Aside from the obvious and prominent presence of Muslims in India for well over a millennium (Muslim Arab traders started settling in what is now Kerala from the eighth century), India has had Christians from at least the fourth century, Jews from the time of the fall of Jerusalem, Parsis from the seventh century, and Sikh from the time that religion was born. Also, pre-Muslim India was not, as it is sometimes claimed, mainly a Hindu country, since Buddhism was the dominant religion in India for many hundreds of years and Jainism has also had an equally long history and in fact,a large continuing presence. Since there is so much discussion these days against Hindus converting to any other religion, it is perhaps worth remembering that arguably the greatest emperor of India was Ashoka in the third century BC (the main rival to Ashoka's claim would be from a Muslim called Akbar), and that Ashoka did convert to Buddhism from what would have been the-then form of Hinduism. I come now to the third reason against making the Indian identity dependent on the Hindu identity. Hindus are defined in two quite distinct ways. When the number of Hindus is counted, and it is established that the vast majority of Indians are in fact Hindu, this is not a counting of religious belief, but essentially of ethnic background. But when generalisations are made about, say, the divinity of Rama or the sacred status of The Ramayana, beliefs are involved. By using the two approaches together, a numerical picture is constructed in which it is supposed that a vast majority of Indians believe in the divinity of Rama and the sacred status of The Ramayana. For a large proportion of the Hindus, however, that attribution would be just a mistake, since millions of people who are defined as Hindu in the first approach do not share these beliefs which is central to the second approach… Indeed, by making this attribution, the champions of Hindu politics undermine the rich tradition of heterodoxy that has been so central to the history of the Hindu culture. It is not often recognised that Sanskrit (including Pali and Prakrit) has a larger literature in the atheistic and agnostic tradition than exists in any other classical language. In the fourteenth century, Madhavacharya's remarkable book called Sarvadar-shanasamgraha ('the collection of all philosophies') which has one chapter each on the major schools of Hindu belief, devoted the entire first chapter to arguments in favour of the atheistic position. The route to Indian identity via a Hindu identity does not, I would argue, survive critical scrutiny for each of these three reasons. They point firmly towards a broader and inclusionary understanding of the Indian identity - much in line with the views of Tagore and Gandhi.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's address in acceptance of an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Civil Law from the University of Oxford

This is an emotional moment for me. Oxford brings back many fond memories I cherish. For this reason, as much as for the intrinsic value of the honour you bestow upon me, I am truly overwhelmed. There can be nothing more valuable than receiving an honorary degree from one's own alma mater. To be so honoured by a university where one has burnt the proverbial midnight oil to earn a regular degree is a most fulfilling experience.

New India, new hope

The world has changed beyond recognition since I was a student here. Yet, some age-old problems endure. Developing countries have found a new voice, a new status, and have acquired a new sense of confidence over the last few decades. As an Indian, I see a new sense of hope and purpose. This new optimism gives us Indians a new sense of self-confidence and it shapes our world view today. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that the success of hundreds of young Indian students and professionals in Universities like Oxford, and elsewhere across the world, has contributed to this renewed self-confidence of a new India.

The economics we learnt at Oxford in the 1950s was also marked by optimism about the economic prospects for the post-War and post-colonial world. But in the 1960s and 1970s, much of the focus of development economics shifted to concerns about the limits to growth. There was considerable doubt about the benefits of international trade for developing countries. I must confess that when I returned home to India, I was struck by the deep distrust of the world displayed by many of my countrymen. We were overwhelmed by the legacy of our immediate past. Not just by the perceived negative consequences of British imperial rule, but also by the sense that we were left out in the cold by the Cold War.

There is no doubt that our grievances against the British Empire had a sound basis. As the painstaking statistical work of the Cambridge historian Angus Maddison has shown, India's share of world income collapsed from 22.6 per cent in 1700, almost equal to Europe's share of 23.3 per cent at that time, to as low as 3.8 per cent in 1952.

Indeed, at the beginning of the 20th Century, "the brightest jewel in the British Crown" was the poorest country in the world in terms of per capita income. However, what is significant about the Indo-British relationship is the fact that despite the economic impact of colonial rule, the relationship between individual Indians and Britons, even at the time of our Independence, was relaxed and, I may even say, benign.

Mahatma and empire

This was best exemplified by the exchange Mahatma Gandhi had here at Oxford in 1931 when he met members of the Raleigh Club and the Indian Majlis. The Mahatma was in England then for the Round Table Conference and during its recess, he spent two weekends at the home of A.D. Lindsay, the Master of Balliol. At this meeting, the Mahatma was asked: "How far would you cut India off from the Empire?" His reply was precise: "From the Empire, entirely; from the British nation not at all, if I want India to gain and not to grieve." He added: "The British Empire is an Empire only because of India. The Emperorship must go and I should love to be an equal partner with Britain, sharing her joys and sorrows. But it must be a partnership on equal terms." This remarkable statement by the Mahatma has defined the basis of our relationship with Britain.

Jawaharlal Nehru echoed this sentiment when he urged the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1949 to vote in favour of India's membership of the Commonwealth. Nehru set the tone for independent India's relations with its former master when he intervened in the Constituent Assembly's debate on India joining the Commonwealth and said:

"I wanted the world to see that India did not lack faith in herself, and that India was prepared to co-operate even with those with whom she had been fighting in the past provided the basis of the cooperation today was honourable, that it was a free basis, a basis which would lead to the good not only of ourselves, but of the world also. That is to say, we would not deny that cooperation simply because in the past we had fought and thus carry on the trail of our past karma along with us. We have to wash out the past with all its evil."

India, Britain as partners

India and Britain set an example to the rest of the world in the way they sought to relate to each other, thanks to the wisdom and foresight of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. When I became the Finance Minister of India in 1991, our Government launched the Indo-British Partnership Initiative. Our relationship had by then evolved to a stage where we had come to regard each other as partners. Today, there is no doubt in my mind that Britain and India are indeed partners and have much in common in their approach to a wide range of global issues.

What impelled the Mahatma to take such a positive view of Britain and the British people even as he challenged the Empire and colonial rule? It was, undoubtedly, his recognition of the elements of fair play that characterised so much of the ways of the British in India. Consider the fact that an important slogan of India's struggle for freedom was that "Self Government is more precious than Good Government." That, of course, is the essence of democracy. But the slogan suggests that even at the height of our campaign for freedom from colonial rule, we did not entirely reject the British claim to good governance. We merely asserted our natural right to self-governance.

Today, with the balance and perspective offered by the passage of time and the benefit of hindsight, it is possible for an Indian Prime Minister to assert that India's experience with Britain had its beneficial consequences too. Our notions of the rule of law, of a constitutional government, of a free press, of a professional civil service, of modern universities and research laboratories have all been fashioned in the crucible where an age-old civilisation met the dominant Empire of the day. These are all elements which we still value and cherish. Our judiciary, our legal system, our bureaucracy, and our police are all great institutions, derived from British-Indian administration and they have served the country well.

Legacies of the Raj

Of all the legacies of the Raj, none is more important than the English language and the modern school system. That is, if you leave out cricket! Of course, people here may not recognise the language we speak, but let me assure you that it is English. In indigenising English, as so many people have done in so many nations across the world, we have made the language our own. Our choice of prepositions may not always be the Queen's English; we might occasionally split the infinitive; and we may drop an article here and add an extra one there. I am sure everyone will agree, however, that English has been enriched by Indian creativity as well and we have given you R.K. Narayan and Salman Rushdie. Today, English in India is seen as just another Indian language.

The idea of India as enshrined in our Constitution, with its emphasis on the principles of secularism, democracy, the rule of law, and, above all, the equality of all human beings irrespective of caste, community, language or ethnicity, has deep roots in India's ancient civilisation. However, it is undeniable that the founding fathers of our republic were also greatly influenced by the ideas associated with the age of enlightenment in Europe. Our Constitution remains a testimony to the enduring interplay between what is essentially Indian and what is very British in our intellectual heritage.

The idea of India as an inclusive and plural society draws on both these traditions. The success of our experiment of building a democracy within the framework of a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious society will encourage all societies to walk the path we have trodden. In this journey, both Britain and India have learnt from each other and have much to teach the world. This is perhaps the most enduring aspect of the Indo-British encounter.

It used to be said that the sun never sets on the British Empire. I am afraid we were partly responsible for sending that adage out of fashion. But if there is one phenomenon on which the sun cannot set, it is the world of the English-speaking people, in which the people of Indian origin are the single largest component.

`Give and take'

No Indian has paid a more poetic and generous tribute to Britain for this inheritance than Rabindranath Tagore. In the opening lines of his Gitanjali, Gurudev says:

"The West has today opened its door,

There are treasures for us to take,

We will take and we will also give,

From the open shores of India's immense humanity."

To see the India-British relationship as one of `give and take' at the time he first did was an act of courage and statesmanship. It was, however, also an act of great foresight. As we look back and also look ahead, it is clear the Indo-British relationship is one of `give and take.' The challenge before us today is to see how we can take this mutually beneficial relationship forward in an increasingly inter-dependent world.

My alma mater

I wish to end by returning to my alma mater. Oxford, since the 19th century, has been a centre for Sanskrit learning and the study of Indian culture. The Boden professorship in Sanskrit, and the Spalding professorship in Eastern Religions and Ethics stand testimony to the university's commitment to India and Indian culture. I recall with pride the fact that the Spalding professorship was held by two very distinguished Indians: Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, who later became the President of India, and by Dr. Bimal Krishna Matilal. In the context of the study and preservation of Indian culture, I also wish to recall the contribution of another Oxonian, Lord Curzon, about whose project to preserve and restore Indian monuments, Jawaharlal Nehru said:

"After every other Viceroy has been forgotten, Curzon will be remembered because he restored all that was beautiful in India."

Oxford has sent out many men to rule India. Some stayed behind to become India's friends. Men like Edward Thompson, Verrier Elwin, and many others are remembered in India for their contribution to our life and society.

I always come back to the city of dreaming spires and of lost causes as a student. I am here this time in all humility as the representative of a great nation and a great people.

Don't Divide Us Further

This is with reference to the recent euphoria about conferring the status of Classical Language to Kannada and Telegu languages.

It's really shocking to see that many so called non-political literary people were involved in demanding classical status for their languages. As if, without the official status the fate and status of these languages would have been questionable. Technically, culturally and emotionally, each and every language in the world is classic in it's own way. The development of a language is perhaps one of the most fascinating things about the human race. Each language shapes up over so many years to express the feelings, emotions, love, technology and above all the culture of a race or creed. This evolution itself qualifies each language, irrespective of it's age and usage, to be classic in it's own unique way. So it really sounds so gross to attribute some special status to a particular language. It's also another way of further dividing our already divided country on another basis.

Linguistically, the present form of any language, be it Tamil or Hindi or anything else, is way different from what it used to be thousand years back. Each language has undergone tremendous changes over the years. Majority of the Indian languages have come from the Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Sino-Tibetan and the Austric group of languages. Both the Dravidian and the Austric groups are much older than the Indo-Aryan group. Apart from Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam, languages with Dravidian origin are still spoken in far off places like Baluchistan (Brahui) and Bengal (Malto). Most of the tribal languages of the Santal, Kol, Bhil, Mundas etc are derived from the Austric family, which is as old as the Dravidian group. Apart from this, most of the modern day major languages of Indo-Aryan group like Bengali, Assamese, Gujarati and Marathi can be traced back to 10th century AD. Manipuri language can be traced back to 3rd century AD. But none of these languages resemble much the primitive forms that existed thousand years back. The fascinating thing is that there have been so much amalgamation between all these languages that it's really hard to isolate the unadulterated nascent forms. This very amalgamation has created, in Tagore's words, the "ocean of the super humans of Bharatavarsha", on the pure banks of which he aspires his mind to arise - "He Mor Chitta, Punya Tirthe Jago Re Dheere / Ei Bharater Mahamanaver Sagar Teere". Let's not speak of Bengali or Tamil or Hindi. Let's realize that we all speak only one language and that's the language of Bharatavarsha. There's no division, there's no special status, there's no rivalry. As mentioned in Upanishads, "Srunvantu Vishve, Amrutashya Putrah", we, all Indians are the children of immortal bliss. We all are equal and for God's sake, let not the politicians divide us further!!

Finally, a lifeline for India’s poor

GURCHARAN DAS, Times of India, 2nd Nov, 2008

Nothing causes as much anxiety in a family as when someone falls sick. Nearly 65% of India’s poor get into debt and 1% fall below the poverty line each year because of illness, according to National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 2004. The answer, of course, is health insurance, but only 6% of India’s workers have it. Free public hospitals are not an option as two out of five doctors are absent, and there is a 50% chance of receiving the wrong treatment, according Jishnu Das and Jeffrey Hammer’s study. This tragic state of affairs is, however, set to change dramatically with Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), a visionary national health insurance scheme, which provides Rs 30,000 ‘in patient’ health benefits at a premium of Rs 600, which the government pays if you are poor. A brainchild of an IAS officer, Anil Swarup, this scheme will succeed when others have failed because of choice, competition and a magical ‘smart card’. A patient can choose from almost 1,000 private or government hospitals. States can choose from 18 public or private insurance companies. Insurers have the incentive to recruit the poor as they earn premiums by doing so. Hospitals will not turn away the poor because they don’t want to lose the Rs 30,000 in potential revenue. The poor have a choice to exit a bad hospital, something that only the rich can do today. Competition between hospitals will improve the quality of healthcare and new hospitals will come up because there is now money in catering to the poor. The insured carry a smart card with a photo, fingerprints of the family, and an official’s ‘key’ who is accountable. It makes transactions cashless and paperless for the 725 pre-agreed medical procedures. This card contains Rs 30,000 and it tracks expenses day to day in the hospital and the money is deducted automatically after each procedure. No need for pre-approval or reimbursement. Since the poor are migratory birds, the smart card empowers a Bihari to use a hospital in Gujarat. Smart cards are designed to prevent fraud because of 11 unique types of embedded software. So far 500,000 cards have been issued in six months covering 2.5 million people. Most states have agreed to the scheme because the centre foots 75% of the premia. Haryana and Gujarat are the most enthusiastic states. Uttarakhand and Orissa are dragging their feet. Kerala is offering it to everyone as long as the non-poor pay their own premia; thus, it has become a universal product of the insurance company. Only Madhya Pradesh and the North-East states, to their disgrace, have not joined. If all goes according to plan, 30 crore people or one third of India will be covered in five years at an annual cost of Rs 4500 crores — a tiny sum compared to the money wasted in dozens of other schemes. Previous state health insurance schemes failed because they insisted that people use public hospitals and public insurers — with predictable results. This one will succeed because insurance companies, hospitals, and patients all have ‘skin in the game’. Smart cards can dramatically cut corruption in all our social programmes. India spends 14% of GDP in subsidies for the poor, which is more than enough to wipe out poverty. But poverty persists because subsidies leak out through corruption. Smart cards can also carry data on payments for rations (PDS) or earnings from employment schemes (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) and it can expose corruption very quickly. Despite the Left’s strident rhetoric, middle class Indians do not resent income transfers to the poor as long as the benefits reach the poor. Our problems in India are of the ‘how’, not of the ‘what’. The smart card addresses the ‘how’, and we know it’s powerful because corrupt officials and politicians are trying hard to kill it. For the nation, it is the best Diwali present amidst all the gloom in the marketplace.

Threat of vigilantism

SWAPAN DASGUPTA - Times of India, 2nd Nov, 2008

In the sixth series of the gripping BBC tele-serial Spooks, the MI5 is confronted by two contrasting adversaries: an Iran hell bent on becoming a nuclear weapons state; and the covert or ganisation, Yalta, that seeks to restore global multi-polarity by bringing the US several notches down. Made up of patriotic stalwarts of the British establishment, Yalta runs a parallel intelligence network, strikes deals with the Islamists and un dertakes bombings and assassinations. Many MI5 agents are lured by Yalta operatives into joining the secret war because they, too, are disconcerted by Britain’s skewed “special relationship” with the US Although over-dramatised and far removed from the cerebral espionage games of John Le Carre’s Cold War thrillers, Spooks addresses a problem confronting the liberal State in an age of crime, sleaze and terrorism: the threat of vigilantism. Modern societies with codified laws and elaborate checks and balances have based themselves on the unstated assumption that the State enjoys a monop oly of violence. Just as there is no legitimacy for insurgents, warlords and ter rorists, there is no space for modern day Robin Hoods or, for that matter, Su perman. Those like Yalta who take it upon themselves to rectify national prob lems through unilateral violence are likely to be viewed in the same vein as say, al-Qaida terrorists as outlaws. The people’s adherence to non-violence is n’t a Gandhian fad; it is a pillar of statecraft. There is no compelling evidence as yet to determine whether the flamboyant Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur and her associates — the alleged practitioners of ‘Hindu terror’ — are guilty of vigilantism or are victims of an elaborate frame up. The signals are confused and conflicting. There are hints that Muslim-domina ted Malegaon was bombed on September 29 as an act of retributive violence — to force Muslims to share the pain of terrorism. At the same time, the instant secularist equation of ‘Hindu’ terror with jihadi terror has prompted concern of a frame-up by a beleaguered government. Certainly, the suggestions of a conspi racy involving serving and retired army officers seem utterly fanciful and could even provoke a backlash. If, for argument’s sake, a Hindu hand in the Malegaon bombings is established does it imply that terrorism is a problem of competitive extremism? This is pre cisely what the government would like us to believe — that there is an immoral equivalence between radical saffron outfits and the treacherous SIMI, and that a ban on one should automatically lead to curbs on the other. Apart from driving a wedge between the BJP and its NDA allies just prior to the election, unearthing a Hindu terrorist conspiracy may help the government project an image of even handedness to those Muslims who feel done in by counter-terrorism. Yet, despite the law treating all terrorists as equal outlaws, there are im portant differences between jihadi terror and the Sadhvi’s alleged criminali ty. Jihadi terror is directed both at the kafirs and the sovereignty of India. Nei ther SIMI nor the Indian Mujahideen have faith in the Constitution. They want nizam-e-mustafa (the rule of God) and terrorism is a means to that elusive pipe dream. Their target is the Indian way of life. The Hindu extremists have a more limited agenda. They want retributive justice against the killers; they feel Hindus are too meek and effete; they want a militarised Hindu society that takes an eye for an eye; and they believe that the alternative to vote-bank politics is to combine the roles of prosecutor, judge and executioner. Jihadi terror is based on warped theology; the extremist Hin du is driven by revenge and frustration. Let’s not delude ourselves that the two are fringe phenomena. The Batla House encounter may have triggered Muslim fury but the Sadhvi is fast ac quiring cult status among angry Indians seeking quick-fix solutions. Terror ism hasn’t won the day but it has disfigured the cosy assumptions on which In dia operated. The moral authority of the state is in tatters.

Tagore's letter to Viceroy of India renouncing Knighthood in protest of Jalianwallahbag mass killing

Your Excellency,

The enormity of the measures taken by the Government in the Punjab for quelling some local disturbances has, with a rude shock, revealed to our minds the helplessness of our position as British subjects in India. The disproportionate severity of the punishments inflicted upon the unfortunate people and the methods of carrying them out, we are convinced, are without parallel in the history of civilised governments, barring some conspicuous exceptions, recent and remote. Considering that such treatment has been meted out to a population, disarmed and resourceless, by a power which has the most terribly efficient organisation for destruction of human lives, we must strongly assert that it can claim no political expediency, far less moral justification. The accounts of the insults and sufferings by our brothers in Punjab have trickled through the gagged silence, reaching every corner of India, and the universal agony of indignation roused in the hearts of our people has been ignored by our rulers- possibly congratulating themselves for imparting what they imagine as salutary lessons. This callousness has been praised by most of the Anglo-Indian papers, which have in some cases gone to the brutal length of making fun of our sufferings, without receiving the least check from the same authority, relentlessly careful in something every cry of pain of judgment from the organs representing the sufferers. Knowing that our appeals have been in vain and that the passion of vengeance is building the noble vision of statesmanship in out Government, which could so easily afford to be magnanimous, as befitting its physical strength and normal tradition, the very least that I can do for my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of the millions of my countrymen, surprised into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges of honour make our shame glaring in the incongruous context of humiliation, and I for my part, wish to stand, shorn, of all special distinctions, by the side of those of my countrymen who, for their so called insignificance , are liable to suffer degradation not fit for human beings. And these are the reasons which have compelled me to ask Your Excellency, with due reference and regret, to relieve me of my title of knighthood, which I had the honour to accept from His Majesty the King at the hands of your predecessor, for whose nobleness of heart I still entertain great admiration.

Yours faithfully,
RABINDRANATH TAGORE
Calcutta,
6, Dwarakanath Tagore Lane,
May 30, 1919